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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

PRO VO CITY,
Plaintifl7Appellee,
Case No. 950464
Priority No. 2

v.
MELBURNFORD,
Defendant/Appellant.

JT?RTSPICTIQN
Appellant was convicted of four class B misdemeanors after a bench trial in the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Provo Department, Utah County, the Hon. Donald J. Eyre, Judge,
presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 26(2Xa) and (b),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(d) and (f), by which a
defendant in a Circuit Court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final order and judgment.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The issues before this Court on appeal are:
1.

Whether an individual can be held personally liable for conduct which violates

municipal zoning laws notwithstanding his claim to be acting on behalf of a corporation which
was involuntarily dissolved more than a year prior to his challenged conduct and which is nothing
more than the individual's alter ego?

1

2.

Whether an individual convicted of zoning law violations may challenge the

validity of the information under which he was convicted when he failed to properly raise that
objection in the lower court?
3.

Whether an individual who claims that his property enjoys nonconforming use

status can satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard necessary for proving that claim
without presenting specific proof that a nonconforming use existed, that such use has continued
uninterrupted, and that recent additional uses do not constitute an unlawful expansion of the
claimed nonconforming use?
4.

Whether a trial court has the authority under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10XaXO

to sentence an individual convicted of four class B misdemeanors to more than 12 months
probation, and whether a trial court's statement that the indivividual must refrain from violating
zoning laws in the future constitutes an improper permanent injunction?

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Question 1:
U.C.A. § 16-10a-1405; Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Mackqy
&KnobelEnters, v. Teton Van Gas, Inc., 460 P.2d 828 (Utah 1969); U.C.A. § 16-10a204; U.C.A. § 16-10a-203(l) & (2); Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995);
U.C.A. § 76-2-205; Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah
1979); MacKayv. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626 (Utah 1995); Provo, UT., Ordinance 7.01.030;
Provo, UT., Ordinance 14.34.080; Provo, UT., Ordinance 11.01.040; Provo, UT.,
Ordinance 14.26.020(4); Provo, UT., Ordinance 14.42.010(3); and Provo, UT., Ordinance
2

14.26.010.
Question 2:
U.C.A. § 76-2-205; U.R.Cr.P. 12; Levy Court of Washington County v. Ringgold, 30 U.S.
451 (1831); and Borden/archer v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
Question 3:
Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316 (1977); Provo, UT., Ordinance 14.36.020;
Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559 (Utah 1967); Swenson v. Salt
Lake City, 398 P.2d 879 (Utah 1965); and Glengary-Gamlin Protective Association, Inc.
v. Bird, 675 P.2d 344 (Id. Ct App. 1983).
Question 4:
U.C.A. § 76-3-204(2); U.C.A. § 77-18-l(10XaX0; and U.C.A. § 77-18-1(8)0).

STATEMENT QF THE CASE
On April 19, 1994, the Cityfiledan information against Appellant, Melburn Ford,
charging him with maintaining a nuisance in violation of Provo, UT., Ordinance 7.01.030; storage
of abandoned, wrecked, or junked vehicles in violation of Provo, UT., Ordinance 14.34.080;
unlawful collection of solid waste without a license in violation of Provo, UT., Ordinance
11.01.040; unlawful dumping in violation of Provo, UT., Ordinance 11.04.020; and impermissible
land use in an M-P zone in violation of Provo, UT., Ordinances 14.26.020(4) and 14.42.010(3).
The parties appeared before Judge Eyre on April 19th and 21st of 1995 for a non-jury trial. At
the close of the City's case, Appellant moved to dismiss on grounds that Ford Construction
Company, Inc., and not Appellant, was the proper party of interest.
3

Having heard the testimony of witnesses and arguments of counsel at trial, the Court
denied Appellant's motion to dismiss and found him guilty of counts I, n, m, and V on April 21,
1995. Appellant was sentenced by Judge Eyre on June 19, 1995, to 90 days in jail and a $750 fine
on each count; however, the jail sentence was suspended, the fine was reduced to $100, and
Appellant was placed on probation on each count. A Notice of Appeal was filed by Appellant on
July 11, 1995.

STATEMENT QF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the decision of the Honorable Judge Donald J. Eyre, Fourth Circuit
Court, Provo Department, Utah County, State of Utah, rendered April 21, 1995. Appellant
appeals the trial court's verdict of guilty.

STATEMENT QF RELEVANT FACTS
(Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the transcripts of the trial and hearings as
such transcripts have been paginated by the certified reporter.)
Appellant, Melburn Ford, was charged with violating several Provo City zoning
ordinances between July 1, 1993, and April 19, 1994. Appellant claimed to be acting on behalf of
Ford Construction Company, Inc. (MFord Construction") in his duties as its general manager
despite the fact that the corporation was involuntarily dissolved by the State Department of
Commerce in June of 1992. (Addendum at A-1.) Appellant purchased the property at issue in
1972 in the name of Ford Construction, but never recorded a deed in the corporation's name or
the name of any other individual or entity. (TR. I at 54, 62.) Consequently, title to the land
4

remained in Velma Snow, the original seller of the land. Appellant claimed at trial that Ford
Construction has continously operated a construction business and yard on the property from
1972 to the present, (TR. II at 38), yet offered no specific evidence to substantiate that claim.
(TR. Hat 92-3.)
Appellant further claimed that when a zoning law amendment changed the property from
an "Industrial and Manufacturing" zone to a "Light Manufacturing" zone in 1974, Ford
Construction acquired a vested right in nonconforming uses on the property which had been
permitted under the previous ordinance. (TR I at 42-3.) The City refuted this claim and offered
evidence showing that such activites as disposing of solid waste was never permitted on the
property. (TR. I at 7 and 63-65.) At trial, Appellant argued that because he was not the owner of
Ford Construction he could not be held liable for its corporate actions. (TR. I at 99-100.) The
City countered by arguing that Appellant possessed all indicia of ownership and control of the
property, that there was no record of any other individual or entity possessing an ownership
interest in the property and, thus, that Appellant was at least the apparent property owner. (TR. I
at 102.)

SUMMARY OF TBE ARGUMENT
Appellant argues that Ford Construction Company, Inc. rather than Appellant himself
should have been held accountable for these zoning law violations. Appellant's claim lacks merit
and must be rejected because Ford Construction did not legaly exist during the relevant time
period, and because Appellant exposed himself to personal liability by engaging in activities that
were well beyond the scope of those normal winding up activities which are permitted by statute.
5

Additionally, Appellant is personlly liable in this case under the alter ego doctrine as well because
there is such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of Ford Construction
and Melburn Ford no longer exist, and because observance of the corporate form would promote
injustice. Even if Appellant is not personally liable under the alter ego doctrine, however, the
broadly worded provisions of the zoning ordinances at issue here reach Appellant's personal
conduct. Consequently, the lower court was correct infindingthat Appellant was guilty of
violating these ordinances.
Appellant argues that the information filed against him by the City was defective because
the charges were not adequatelyframedto inlcude him personally. This claim likewise lacks merit
because the laws under which Appellant was convicted specifically applied to his individual acts.
Furthermore, Appellant is barred from even raising the issue of a defective charging document
because he did not raise that objection five days prior to trial as required by Rule 12 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor did he properly raise the issue in the trial court.
Appellant's claim that the activities on his property were permitted as lawful
nonconforming uses is without merit here as well. First, he failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that his property has a nonconforming use even as a construction yard, let alone any
other nonconforming uses. Consequently, the trial court ruled that Appellant failed to cany his
burden of proving that he had a valid nonconforming use on his land. The court further ruled that
Appellant impermissibly expanded the uses on his land by allowing an asphalt business to operate
thereon and permitting the disposal of solid waste without a license. Because such factual
findings can only be overturned if clearly erroneous, this Court should affirm these findings.
Finally, Appellant claims that the trial court exceeded its authority in fashioning the Order
6

of Sentence by extending his period of probation beyond 12 months. The Court should reject this
claim because it misinterprets the statutory authority of the trial court, which isfreeto impose
terms of probation longe than 12 month.

ARGUMENT
L

BECAUSE APPELLANT WAS PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
ZONING ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED,
THE CITY WAS JUSTIFIED IN PROSECUTING HIM
Appellant argues that Ford Construction Company, Inc. (MFord Construction11) and not

Appellant himself, assumed liability and should have been held accountable for the zoning law
violations for which he was convicted. Appellant's claim lacks merit and must be rejected for
several reasons. First, Ford Construction was involuntarily dissolved by the Department of
Commerce prior to the commission of zoning ordinance violations for which Appellant was
convicted and, thus, Appellant's personal conduct was not shielded by corporate status. Second,
if Ford Construction did legally exist during the period in which the zoning ordinance violations
occurred, such corporation was merely Appellant's alter ego, rendering Appellant liable for its
illegal activities. And third, the zoning ordinances which Appellant was convicted of violating
apply to him whether or not he is the lawful owner of the property1 at issue herein.

A.

Appellant's Claim That Ford Construction Is the Only Party That Could
Be Held Responsible for Zoning Ordinance Violations in this Case Lacks

Merit Because That Corporation Does Not Legally Exist
Appellant claims that he cannot be lawfully prosecuted for zoning violations existing on

1

Anytime this brief uses the termi "Ford Construction property," "Appellant's property," "property herein at issue,"
or such similar term, Appellee is referring to the property located at approximately 2000 W. 820 N., Provo, Utah, unless
otherwise noted.

7

Appellant claims that he cannot be lawfully prosecuted for zoning violations existing on
property owned by Ford Construction. However, Appellant's claim lacks merit because (1)
the corporation on whose behalf he claims to have been acting was legally nonexistent during
the time period relevant to this action, and (2) Appellant exposed himself to personal liability
by exceeding the scope of permissible post-dissolution activities undertaken on behalf of Ford
Construction.
This Court should reject Appellant's first claim because Ford Construction Company,
Inc. was involuntarily dissolved by the Department of Commerce on June 1, 1992,2 thirteen
months before the zoning violations for which he was convicted occurred.3 Thus, Appellant's
conduct took place when Ford Construction did not legally exist as a corporation in this state.
The Utah Court of Appeals observed the effect of dissolution on a corporation's existence
when it stated, "Once a corporation completes the winding up process [under the involuntary
dissolution provision of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405], its corporate existence is
terminated." Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74, 83 fh. 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert,
granted, 899 P.2d 1231. See also Mackay & KnobelEnters, v. Teton Van Gas, Inc., 460
P.2d 828, 829 (Utah 1969) (referring to dissolved corporations as those "whose life has . . .
been terminated"). Thus, Appellant's claim lacks merit because an individual acting on behalf
of a nonexistent corporation is afforded no protection from personal liability for his or her
actions.

2

Scc Certification of Involuntary Dissolution in the Appendix at A-l.

5

Appellant was convicted for zoning ordinance violations occurring on his property from July 1, 1993, to April 11,
1994. (TR. II at 88-94.)

8

Rejection of Appellant's claim is further compelled by the fact that once an
involuntarily dissolved corporation ceases to exist, individuals become personally liable for
activities they undertake on behalf of that corporation beyond that of winding up the
corporation's business.4 As the Murphy court stated,
Dissolution has always carried severe consequences, not the least of which is the end of
the corporation. Furthermore, the directors, officers, and shareholders risk exposure to
personal liability if the corporation continues to carry on business. . . . Additionally,
the shareholders may also "become liable as partners where they agree to continue the
business after dissolution, or participate in such continued business.
Id. at 78 (quoting 3 A William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations § 8132 (1990)). This Court must, therefore, determine first whether activities
beyond those associated with winding up the business of Ford Construction were undertaken in
this case, and if so, whether Appellant personally undertook such activities.
The first prong of this inquiry can be quickly answered by the Court. The record
below indisputably establishes that the activities of Ford Construction were carried on long
after the necessary winding up period and, in fact, have never slowed down but instead have
expanded5 and continued to operate to the present date. Indeed, the specific zoning violations
for which Appellant was convicted occurred more than a year after Ford Construction was
involuntarily dissolved. Therefore, because activities beyond those necessary to wind up the
affairs of Ford Construction have continued long after the permissible post-dissolution period,
the Court must now determine whether Appellant was responsible for any of those activities.

4
Although U.C.A. J 16-10a-1405 (1995) states that a corporation continues its corporate existence after dissolution,
the statute makes clear that such existence continues only until the dissolved corporation winds up its remaining business
obligations.

^The trial court expressly held that Appellant had expanded his use of his property. (TR. n at 92-3.)
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Again, the Court can quickly answer this prong of the inquiry in the affirmative. The
trial transcript provides substantial evidence that during the period covering the zoning
violations herein at issue, Appellant personally controlled the Ford Construction property, held
himself out as the owner of that property, and was treated as the property owner by those who
testified at trial.6 Indeed, Appellant has offered no evidence that suggests anyone other than he
controlled the property and supervised the activities occurring thereon. Furthermore, if
Appellant acted on behalf of his corporation as he contends, then he did so contrary to the
provisions of U.C.A. § 16-10a-204 (1995), which states, "All persons purporting to act as or
on behalf of a corporation, knowing there was no incorporation under this chapter, are jointly
and severally liable for all liabilities created while so acting.917
The language, "all persons," makes this statute applicable to Appellant irrespective of
his relationship to or status with the dissolved Ford Construction.8 Referring to a similar
provision in the former Utah Business Corporation Act, the Utah Supreme Court recently

*The following witnesses all testified that Appellant owned and/or controlled the Ford Construction property: Skip
Tandy, a Provo City zoning officer (TR. I at 9); Vclma Snow, the original owner of the propeity (TR. I at 56-63); Dwfeht
Hill, Utah County Environmental Health Department Director (TR. I at 73-4); Barbara Kinghorn, a neighboring propeity
owner (TR. I at 89-92); Douglas Hair, lives on and takes care of the property with his wife (TR. II at 30-1); Galen Maxwell,
lessee of portion of propeity (TR. II at 38, 42-4, 49-50); and Cathy Hair, lives on and takes care of the propeity with her
husband (TR. II at 58, 66-7).
7
Although it is true that under U.C.A. § 16-10a-203(l) incorporation occurs when articles of incorporation are
properly filed, the following language of 8 16-10a-203(2) suggests that involuntary dissolution affects the validity of an
incorporation: "Thefilingof the articles of incorporation by the division is conclusive proof that all conditions precedent to
incorporation have been satisfied, except in a proceeding by the state to cancel or revoke the incorporation or involuntarily
dissolve the corporation."

"Defendant asserts that he was not an officer or director of Ford Construction, but merely a general manager.
(Appellant's Brief at 6.) However, § 16-10a-204 applies to "all persons" without regard to title or position. U.C.A. 9 76-2205 (1995), similarly imposes criminal liability on an individual in similar circumstances irrespective of whether the
individuals is an officer of the corporation or owns the propeity at issue: "A person is criminally liable for conduct
constituting an offense which he performs or causes to be performed in the name of or on behalf of a corporation or
association to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in his own name or behalf." See also State v. Obrien, 774
P.2d 1109 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant could be held criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense that he
performed in the name of or on behalf of his corporation).
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stated, N[P]ersons who act as if pursuant to valid corporate authority, after that authority has
been suspended, are personally responsible for liabilities arising from the continued
operation." Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872, 878 (Utah 1995). Appellant does not
specifically deny the occurrence of the zoning violations for which he was convicted.9 Instead,
he argues that any criminal liability associated with the activities on his property must be born,
if at all, by Ford Construction. This inaccurate argument is at odds with the law of
corporations. As previously stated, Appellant's personal liability for actions undertaken on
behalf of a dissolved corporation is no different than had he performed those actions entirely
on his own behalf. Therefore, because Appellant exceeded the scope of Ford Construction's
authority to wind up business, he was exposed to personal liability for all activities he
supervised on the Ford Construction property between July 1, 1993, and April 11, 1994.

B.

If Ford Construction Did Legally Exist During the Relevant Time Period, it
Was Merely Appellant's Alter Ego and He Is Liable for its Activities

Should this Court find that the zoning law violations for which Appellant was convicted
were activities undertaken on behalf of a valid corporation, the City argues in the alternative
that the Court should find Appellant personally liable because Ford Construction is nothing
more than his "alter ego." In Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028,
1030 (Utah 1979), the state Supreme Court held that a corporate entity can be disregarded
under the equitable alter ego doctrine if (1) there is such a unity of interest and ownership that
the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, and (2)
observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable

'Defendant's alternative claim that he had a valid nonconforming use on his property is discussed below.
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result would follow. The present case requires application of the alter ego doctrine given
Appellant's sole and unbridled control over Ford Construction, and because Appellant would
otherwise escape responsibility for overseeing and in other instances committing zoning law
violations on his property.
The evidence presented at trial suggests that Appellant and Ford Construction are one
and the same. For instance, Skip Tandy, the Provo City zoning officer who investigated the
zoning ordinance violations on Appellant's property, testified that his efforts to ascertain who
owned the Ford Construction property all pointed to Melburn Ford, and Melburn Ford alone.
(TR. I at 9.) When the complaints about zoning law violations began coming into his office,
Mr. Tandy first did a record search to determine who held title to the Ford Construction land.
That search indicated that Velma Snow of Heber, Utah, held title to that property. However,
in response to a letter from Mr. Tandy regarding the zoning problems on the property, Ms.
Snow wrote a letter in November of 1993 stating, "I sold the ground to Melburn Ford" in
1972. (TR. I at 58-61.) Ms. Snow's correspondence gave Mr. Tandy no reason to believe
that the property was owned by anyone other than Appellant and the City was justified in
proceeding against him on that basis.
At trial, Ms. Snow's own testimony provided further evidence of the unity of interest
and ownership between Appellant and Ford Construction. Upon direct questioning her
answers revealed that Appellant and Ford Construction were essentially a single entity insofar
as the property transaction was concerned. For example, Ms. Snow stated that it was
Appellant who represented Ford Construction in her dealings with the corporation, that it was
Appellant who approached her and negotiated the land sale, and that it was Appellant who
12

made the regular payments towards the purchase price. (TR. I at 56-63.) In fact, in her
dealings with Ford Construction Ms. Snow apparently has never interacted with anyone other
than Appellant. Thus, her testimony supports the conclusion that Ford Construction was
nothing more than Appellant's alter ego.
The testimony of Dwight Hill, Environmental Health Department Director for Utah
County, likewise suggested that the issue of whether Ford Construction was actually Appellant
himself was never in question for both himself and other County officials. Mr. Hill testified
that when he and others went to Appellant's property to investigate complaints of illegal solid
waste dumping, he sought and received permission to inspect the premises from Appellant
himself. (TR. I at 73.) In response to the question of who controlled the property, Mr. Hill
stated, "Well, we never really had any doubt that Mr. Ford was in control of the property."
(TR. I at 73.) He went on to describe other encounters with Appellant that led him to reach
the conclusion that Appellant controlled the property. Indeed, in response to an objection
from Appellant's counsel regarding Mr. Hill's testimony, the trial court stated, "I think it is
relevant that any statements made by Mr. Ford would indicate that he was controlling the
property." (TR. I at 78.)
Some of the strongest evidence suggesting that Ford Construction was Appellant's alter
ego and that Appellant is the owner of both the company and the land on which it sits came
from Appellant's own witnesses, Douglas and Cathy Hair. The Hairs have been living on
Appellant's property since 1989 and have been working for him in the capacity of caretakers.
In response to various questions from the prosecuting attorney, Mr. Hair testified that
Appellant is both the manager and owner of Ford Construction and the property on which it
13

sits. (TR. II at 30.) He further testified that it is Appellant who has the right to say whether
people come or go on the property, it is Appellant to whom the Hairs are directly accountable,
and it is Appellant who handles such financial aspects of the construction business as billing
companies for dumping materials on the property. (TR. n at 30-31).
The testimony of Mrs. Hair is similar to that of her husband. In response to the
question of whether Appellant is the owner of Ford Construction, Mrs. Hair stated, "I guess,
yeah.M (TR. II at 66.) When asked if Appellant has authority over the Ford Construction
property she responded, "Uh-huh." (TR. n at 66.) Mrs. Hair likewise reluctantly conceded
that it is Appellant to whom she pays rent. (TR. II at 67.) In a telling response to a question
regarding her interaction with Mr. Tandy on the Ford Construction property months before
trial, Mrs. Hair recounted, "I just asked him if he planned on moving Mr. Ford off his own
land." (TR. n at 58 (italics added).) Such testimony from the individuals who live on the
very property at issue and who perhaps know Appellant and his circumstances better than any
other witness provides a very strong argument in favor of applying the alter ego doctrine in
this case.
Indeed, the testimony of these and other witnesses proves that there was such a unity of
interest and ownership here that the separate personalities of Appellant and Ford Construction
no longer existed. Moreover, there can be little doubt that observance of the corporate form
under these circumstances would promote injustice. Because Ford Construction was
involuntarily dissolved by the state in 1992-and the two-year statutory period for reinstating
corporate status has passed with no apparent attempt to cure the deficiencies which led to
involuntary dissolution-there is no longer any person or entity other than Appellant to hold
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responsible for these zoning violations. Nor is there anyone other than Appellant who appears
to be involved in the administration or control of activities occurring on the Ford Construction
property. (TR. I at 100-101.) If Appellant is allowed to disregard the police powers of a
municipal corporation of this state and avoid prosecution for ignoring zoning laws by merely
assuming protection behind some presumed corporate veil, justice will be denied here.
In this case the City did its best to determine who held title to the property. When the
City's efforts revealed that Appellant paid for the land, managed the business, and supervised
all activities occurring on the property, it was justified in requiring that Appellant-as the only
apparent property owner-abate the zoning law violations. As the trial court aptly noted,
[TJhere was no note anywhere that this property was not owned by anyone besides
Melburn Ford. He didn't record the deed. . . . Testimony has been from all parties
that he was the person in control of that property. That has been uncontroverted. . . .
Court does therefore find that Mr. Ford was the person in control of that property and
subject to the regulations of the City.
(TR. n 88-9.) This finding by the lower court is well reasoned given the overwhelming
indicia of ownership and control by Appellant. Moreover, such a factual finding cannot be
disturbed unless clearly erroneous. As was recently stated in MacKay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d
626, 629 (Utah 1995) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)), "[W]e will
not reverse the finding of fact of a trial court sitting without a jury unless they are 'against the
clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Given that there is no
evidence of anyone other than Appellant exercising control or ownership over the property,
coupled with the fact that he has held himself out as the property owner, that he was treated as
the property owner by virtually every witness who testified at trial, and that he has refused to
record a property deed in the construction company's name, Appellant should be held
15

personally responsible for the zoning problems on the Ford Construction property.
Because the trial court's factual findings support the conclusion that Ford Construction
is merely Appellant's alter ego, and because it would promote injustice and result in inequity if
the corporate form were observed, this Court should disregard the corporate existence and
affirm the lower court's holding.
C.

The Language of the Ordinances under Which Appellant Was Convicted Is

Sufficiently Broad to Reach Appellant Regardless of His Association With
Ford Construction
Appellant's claim that he was wrongly prosecuted in this case is further undermined by
the fact that the ordinances under which he was convicted are sufficiently broad to reach
Appellant personally, irrespective of whether he was acting on behalf of a legal corporation.
Consequently, the lower court was correct in finding that Appellant was personally guilty of
violating the ordinances.
The first count on which Appellant was convicted was maintaining a nuisance in
violation of Provo, UT., Ordinance 7.01.030. The language of that law states: "It shall be
unlawful and a misdemeanor violation for any person to maintain or assist in maintaining a
nuisance after receiving notice to abate the same." (Italics added.) The plain language of this
ordinance makes it applicable to any person who is guilty of violating the law irrespective of
whether that person owns the land on which it occurs. In finding that Appellant maintained or
assisted in maintaining a nuisance on the Ford Construction property, the trial court observed
the broad language of this ordinance and noted its application to "any person." (TR. I at 102.)
The lower court, therefore, properly held that Ordinance 7.01.030 applies to Appellant
personally and made the following factual finding:
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I think the testimony is clear based upon the pictures that have been presented to the
Court and the testimony of the parties that have been on the property that there is an
accumulation of rubbish, trash, refuse, junk, abandoned materials, inoperable vehicles
on that property.
(TR. n at 89.) This finding was correct and because Appellant has not shown it to be clearly
erroneous it should not be disturbed.
Storage of abandoned, wrecked, or junked vehicles in violation of Provo, UT.,
Ordinance 14.34.080, was the second count on which Appellant was convicted. The relevant
language of that ordinance reads:
It shall be unlawful to park, store or leave or permit the parking, storing, or leaving of
any licensed or unlicensed motor vehicles of any kind . . . which is in a wrecked,
junked, partially dismantled, inoperative, or abandoned condition . . . upon any private
property . . . for a period of time in excess of seventy-two (72) hours.
(Italics added.) The language of this law likewise broadly applies to anyone who either
personally stores or permits the storage of junked vehicles. The evidence produced at trial
indisputably establishes that wrecked, junked, or inoperative vehicles were unlawfully parked,
stored, or left on the Ford Construction property. As the lower court stated, "The Court also
finds that based upon also basically the testimony of the defense's witnesses that he does have
wrecked, junked and partially dismantled vehicles on that property." (TR. n at 91.) The
court's finding is sound given that Appellant's own witnesses and employees, Douglas and
Kathy Hair, testified that abandoned, wrecked, or junked vehicles were, in fact, stored on the
property, (TR. n at 34, 37, and 69.) 10 Hence, the trial court correctly concluded that
Ordinance 14.34.080 applied to Appellant personally.

"Appellant's counsel likewise conceded at trial that Appellant had brought 13 inoperable vehicles onto his property.
(TR. n at 96-8.)
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The third count on which Appellant was convicted was unlawful collection of solid
waste without a license in violation of Provo, UT., Ordinance 11.01.040. The relevant
language of that ordinance reads: "Except as otherwise provided in these ordinances, it shall be
unlawful for anyone other than the city to collect, transport or dispose of solid waste in Provo
City without a license therefor." (Italics added.) Again, the broad language of this law makes
it literally applicable to anyone. The evidence at trial established that solid waste was
collected and disposed of on Appellant's property. Appellant stipulated and the trial court
found that he did not have a valid license to collect or dispose of such waste. (TR. I at 64-5
and TR. II at 90-1.) Furthermore, the trial court found that Appellant personally controlled
the property, witness testimony established that Appellant personally supervised the activities
occurring on that property, and Appellant himself claims to have been the general manager of
Ford Construction company at that time. (Appellant's Brief at 6.) Consequently, Appellant's
personal liability under this ordinance is obvious.
The final count on which Appellant was convicted was impermissible land use in an MP zone in violation of Provo, UT., Ordinances 14.26.020(4) and 14.42.010(3). Ordinance
14.26.020(4) stSLtcs that "the following principal uses and structures, and no others are
permitted in the M-P zone," and then gives a comprehensive list of permitted uses which does
not include maintaining a landfill. Ordinance 14.42.010(3) establishes the criminal liability of
anyone "[d]oing, or failing to do, anything required by the provisions" of the Provo City
zoning ordinances. As with the ordinances previously discussed, the liberal terms of these two
provisions apply to anyone found to be violating them. For instance, nothing in the purpose
and objectives section of this ordinance (14.26.010) states or infers that it shall apply only to
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property owners. Thus, assuming, arguendo, that Appellant is not the owner of the property
herein at issue, he is still personally liable under these laws.
The evidence presented at trial established and the trial court found that the Ford
Construction property is in an M-P zone. (TR. I at 6.) By the express terms of Ordinance
14.26.020(4) any use not permitted in this zone is excluded from it. The trial court found that
Appellant maintained a landfill or salvage yard on his property, (TR. II at 93), which is not a
permitted use in an M-P zone. Consequently, Appellant is personally liable under the express
provisions of all four ordinances under which he was convicted. The trial court's factual
findings are afforded substantial deference in circumstances such as these and should only be
disturbed if clearly erroneous. See MacKay, 896 P.2d at 629 (discussing clearly erroneous
standard of judicial review). Because the lower court's findings are not clearly erroneous this
Court should affirm its decision.

IL

THE INFORMATION UNDER WHICH APPELLANT WAS CHARGED AND
CONVICTED WAS VALID AND FAILURE TO CHALLENGE ITS VALIDITY
BELOW CONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF THAT OBJECTION
A.

Appellant Cannot Assert That the Information Charging Him with Zoning
Law Violations Was Defective Because He Did Not Properly Raise That

Issue in the Lower Court
Appellant argues that the information filed against him by the City was defective
because it did not put him on notice that the City intended to prosecute Appellant personally as
an agent of a corporation pursuant to U.C.A. § 76-2-205. Appellant's claim should be
rejected by this Court for three reasons. First, although the City could have chosen to
prosecute him under the above-noted statute, Appellant was tried and convicted under other,
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no less applicable ordinances that served the ends of justice in this case. Second, Appellant
cannot properly raise this issue on appeal because he did not raise it five days prior to trial as
required by Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure ("U.R.Cr.P."). Third,
Appellant likewise cannot raise this issue on appeal because he failed to properly raise the
issue in the trial court.
The decision on whether, when and what to charge rests solely on the shoulders of the
designated prosecuting attorney. Levy Court of Washington County v. Ringgold, 30 U.S. 451
(1831). Only the prosecuting attorney has authority to determine what charges should be filed
to satisfy the ends of justice in any given case. BordenJdrcher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
A very high degree of deference is given to the prosecutor's charging decision and courts will
generally not review those decisions. Id. Here a decision was made to charge Appellant
under the ordinances discussed in the preceding section. The decision to pursue these charges
was made thoughtfully and was based on all relevant factors known to the City. The fact that
the trial court found Appellant guilty of four of the five counts which the City chose to charge
him with suggests that the prosecuting attorney's charging decision was reasonable and sound
under the circumstances.
However, even if the information filed against Appellant had charged him with the
"wrong" offense or otherwise had been defective, Appellant is barred from raising that
objection in this Court because he did not properly raise it below. Rule 12 of the U.R.Cr.P.
states that any objections based on defects in the indictment or information must be raised at
least five days prior to trial, unless the objection is based on a claim that the information fails
to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense. Appellant's claim here is not
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jurisdictional in nature, nor does he assert that the information fails to charge an offense.
Instead, Appellant merely argues that the City has "got the wrong guy in court." (TR. I at
54.) Although the City understands Appellant's belief that he is not responsible for these
unlawful acts, the evidence suggests that he is liable under the circumstances and the City has
a duty to uphold and enforce the laws of this municipality.
Therefore, because Appellant did not raise a defective information objection five days
prior to trial as required by the state rules of criminal procedure, he has waived any objection
regarding the validity of the information filed against him. As stated in U.R.Cr.P. 12(d),
"Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must
be made prior to trial. . . shall constitute a waiver thereof." Should this Court find that
failure to object five days prior to trial is not fatal and that Appellant may be granted relief
from his waiver, the City argues that Appellant waived the objection a second time by not
properly objecting at trial. Indeed, such was the conclusion of the trial court when it stated,
"Nor has the fact that [Mr. Ford] was not the party of interest raised as part of this trial."
(TR. n at 88.) Although Appellant's counsel addressed the issue superficially, he did not raise
an objection in a timely or formal manner such that it would be recognized by the trial court as
having been raised. For these reasons, the City urges this Court to reject Appellant's defective
information claim and affirm the holding of the lower court.
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ID.

APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT HIS PROPERTY ENJOYS NONCONFORMING
USE STATUS IS WITHOUT MERIT BECAUSE 1HAT FACT WAS NEVER
ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL AND BECAUSE HE HAS IMPERMISSIBLY
EXPANDED THE USES ON HIS PROPERTY
A.

Appellant Failed to Carry His Burden of Establishing hv a Preponderance
of the Evidence That He Had a Valid Nonconforming Use

Appellant claims that he should not have been convicted for zoning law violations
because the activities on his property were permitted under a prior zoning law and could be
continued as lawful nonconforming uses. Where a violation of a zoning ordinance is shown,
the burden of proof is on the violator to prove a pre-existing nonconforming use by a
preponderance of the evidence. Fillmore Gty v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316, 1318 (1977).
Appellant's claim lacks merit and should be rejected by this Court because after the trial court
found a zoning ordinance violation Appellant failed to carry his burden of proving that he had
a valid nonconforming use.
Before Appellant's claim can even be considered, he must establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that he had a valid nonconforming use on his property beginning prior to the
1974 zoning change. "A nonconforming use will not be recognized in the absence of
sufficient competent evidence to prove it was lawfully in existence at the time the ordinance
was enacted and that it has continued in existence/ 8A McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 25.188.50
(3rd ed. 1994). Moreover, under Provo, UT., Ordinance 14.36.020, a nonconforming use
can never be discontinued for a continuous period of more than six months without losing its
nonconforming use status. Appellant's claim, therefore, fails because he has neither presented
evidence establishing an original nonconforming use on his property nor presented evidence
that such use has continued uninterrupted as required by law. The trial court noted, "[T]here's
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been no testimony as to when this particular use of the property as a construction yard began."
(TR. n at 92.) In fact, because Appellant failed to provide the court with any evidence
regarding what uses may have continually existed since the 1974 zoning change, the trial court
was unable to make a "finding as to whether [Appellant] has a valid nonconforming use as to
his construction business." (TR. n at 93.)
Indeed, at trial Appellant merely asserted that his property enjoys nonconforming use
status as a construction yard without supporting that claim with any evidence. For example,
he states in his brief that "evidence at trial showed that Ford Construction Co., Inc., has used
the subject property in its construction business since it acquired the property in 1972," and
cites to the testimony of Velma Snow in the record. (Appellant's Brief at 13.) Yet, as with
the testimony of all other witnesses, the testimony of Ms. Snow does not show that the
property has been used continually as a construction yard. Instead, Ms. Snow's testimony
merely states that the 1972 purchase agreement used to sell her property to Appellant listed
Ford Construction as the buyer.11 (TR. I at 53, 60.) Furthermore, evidence could not have
been presented establishing a valid nonconforming use of the property given the fact that, at
the insistence of Appellant's counsel, the trial court restricted its focus almost entirely to the
period covering the charged offenses without accepting testimony regarding earlier events.
(TR. I at 21-23, 29, 67, 85-86.)
Most importantly, however, is the fact that the issue of whether Appellant's property
enjoyed nonconforming use status is moot given that uses to which Appellant's property has

"The trial court expressly rejected the notion that evidence suggesting Ford Construction purchased the property in
1972 in any way sheds tight on the issue of whether a valid nonconforming use existed. (TR. II at 92.)
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been put were not valid uses even under the zoning law in effect prior to 1974. As the trial
court properly found, "Even if [Appellant] does have a grandfather of a nonconforming use
under the zoning laws, . . . he cannot use that property for a use that was not permitted under
the former ordinance." (TR. n at 92.) In this case Appellant used his property to dispose of
or store solid waste and to maintain a junk or salvage yard, both of which were not permitted
uses under the original zoning ordinance. In this regard the lower court stated, " B u t . . . he
has permitted—used that property for uses that were not permitted at that time. Those being a
salvage yard or a junk yard or the place where there was solid waste upon his property." (TR.
II at 93.) This Court should not consider the question, therefore, because it was not properly
raised in the trial court. Therefore, because Appellant did not establsih by a preponderance of
the vidence that he had a valid nonconforming use, his claim must be rejected.

B.

The Trial Court Properly Found That Even If Appellant Had a
Nonconforming Use His Activities Constituted an Unlawful Expansion of

EiaLIIse
In addition to rejecting Appellant's claim because he engaged in uses that were not even
permitted under the original zoning law, his claim should also be rejected because Appellant
expanded his use of the property to include a road milling and asphalt grinding business
entirely different and unrelated to his construction business. This was the finding of the lower
court and Appellant has not shown it to be clearly erroneous.
The evidence at trial showed that Appellant unlawfully expanded the uses on his
property. For instance, Mr. Galen Maxwell, owner of Interstate Asphalt, testified that
Appellant leased a portion of his property to Mr. Maxwell for the purpose of carrying on his
asphalt business. (TR. II at 38.) Mr. Maxwell further testified that the business operations of
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Ford Construction consisted entirely of serving as an excavating pipeline contractor and of
leasing construction equipment during the period of July of 1993, to April of 1994. (TR. n at
44.) Thus, Appellant's own witness testified that Appellant permitted a use (i.e., asphalt
material storage) to occur on his property that was new and different from the use to which
Appellant had previously applied the land. In fact, Mr. Maxwell testified that Appellant
allowed another company, Staker Paving, to use his property for storing and disposing of road
base materials during the relevant period as well. (TR. n at 43.) Consequently, the lower
court was correct in finding,
Further, he's expand[ed]~based upon the testimony of Mr. Maxwell, you cannot
expand a nonconforming use once the new ordinances have been established. By
allowing Mr. Maxwell to use that property for an asphalt business, that's not a
permitted use even under the-it's not a permitted use under the new ordinance.
Therefore, . . . that's an unlawful use of the property.
(TR. n at 93.) As has been previously mentioned, such factual findings are afforded due
deference and where evidence is in conflict, appellate courts should assume that the trial court
believed those aspects of evidence that support its findings. Reeve, 571 P.2d at 1318.
Here, Appellant has declared—without proving-that he had a right to continue using his
property as a construction yard for an indefinite period of time. Yet, he has made no attempt
to define or describe exactly what uses fit under his "construction yard activities" umbrella. It
is not correct to assume that anything which can be considered to be remotely related to
construction company activities are permitted on his land whether or not he has ever engaged
in those activities in the past. The operative word in the phrase "nonconforming use" is the
word use—i.e. 9 the only activities which will be permitted to continue contrary to a new zoning
law are those in which Appellant was actually engaged and in which he has continued to
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engage on a continuous basis since the zoning law was changed. "To establish an existing use,
the owner must show more than a mere intention or preparation to engage in the use. Rather,
the owner must show the existence of an actual use, evidenced by overt acts." 8A McQuillin
Mun. Corp. § 25.188 (3rd ed. 1994).
Thus, Appellants reliance on Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake Gty, 431 P.2d
559 (Utah 1967), is misplaced because that case involved the use of property by its new
owners who were merely continuing the use in which the previous owners had engaged.
Likewise, it is the actual continuous use of an existing nonconforming use not just a potential
use which endows property owners with vested rights in such use. See Swenson v. Salt Lake
Gty, 398 P.2d 879 (Utah 1965). This point is stated explicitly in another case on which
Appellant unjustifiably relies. The Idaho Court of Appeals stated, "The owner of a lawful
nonconforming use has a right to continue that use despite the conflicting provisions of the
subsequently enacted zoning ordinance. " Glengary-Gamlin Protective Association, Inc. v.
Bird, 675 P.2d 344 (Id. Ct. App. 1983) (italics added). Because Appellant seeks to do that
which was never permitted under the prior zoning law as well as to expand the scope of what
he claims to be a valid nonconforming use, his claim that the City has effected a regulatory
taking of his property is simply without merit.
The trial court, therefore, properly found that Appellant was not immunized from
prosecution for zoning law violations by a valid nonconforming use and its holding should be
affirmed on appeal.
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IV.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS WELL WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING
THE TERMS OF APPELLANT'S SENTENCE
Appellant claims that the trial court exceeded its authority in fashioning the Order of

Sentence by extending his period of probation beyond 12 months. This Court should reject
Appellant's claim because it misinterprets the lower court's statutory authority.
Appellant was convicted of four class B misdemeanors. Under U.C.A. § 76-3-204(2)
the trial court could have sentenced him to six months in jail on each count, for a total of 24
months in jail. Instead, the court imposed a 90 day jail sentence for each count, but then
suspended the sentence and placed Appellant on probation for each count. The court stated,
"The Court suspends the jail sentence and all but $100 of the fine on each count and places
Defendant on probation to the Court." (Addendum at A-2.) U.C.A. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i)
permits, but does not require, the trial court to terminate Appellant's probation for a class B
misdemeanor after 12 months have been served. The relevant provision states, "Probation
may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon completion without
violation o f . . . 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions." Id. (italics
added).
Appellant asserts that this statute authorizes the trial court to impose a probationary
period of only 12 months. This claim is incorrect. The plain language of the statute states that
trial courts may impose 12 month terms of probation in their discretion, it does not limit the
courts to that term.12 Furthermore, the provision applies to each count for which Appellant

ia
Thii language differt drastically from a previous version of the law which stated, "Upon completion without
violation o f . . . six months in class B misdemeanor cases, the offender shall be terminated from sentence." U.C.A. } 77-18l(10)(a) (1984). See State v. Maya, 815 P.2d 1312, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (discussin the application of the former law).
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was convicted. Hence, even if Appellant's claim were correct he could recieve 4 separate
terms of probation for each conviction he recieved. In other words, under the Appellant's
approach he could recieve a probationary term of 48 months if the trial court wished.
Nevertheless, the trial court is not limited in the way Appellant suggests because the plain
language of the statute governs, and that language makes a 12 month period of probation
discretionary.
Appellant also claims that the lower court's sentence amounts to an unauthorized
permanent injunction. This claim too must be rejected because it misconstrues the trial court's
sentence. First, the court's sentence merely states the common-sensical fact that individuals
must refrain from breaking the law. The court stated, "In Defendant's use of that property in
the future, he is not to violate Provo City ordinances, specifically with respect to Provo City
zoning ordinances and solid waste ordinances." (Addendum at A-3.) Rather than being a
permanent injunction, this statement is more accurately characterized as a word of caution to
an individual who had repeatedly demonstrated an unwillingness to comply with zoning laws.13
Furthermore, U.C.A. § 77-18-l(8)(j) expressly grants authority to the trial court to make
Appellant "comply with other terms and conditions [of probation] the court considers
appropriate." Thus, Appellant's claim that his sentence amounts to a permanent injunction is
without merit and should be rejected by this Court.

"For example, apparently while the trial was still in progress Appellant disregarded the zoning laws once again by
storing more inoperative vehicles on his property. (TR. II at 95-99.)
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CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons the City respectfully requests that Appellant's conviction
be affirmed.
Dated this

*>M

day of February, 1996
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VERNON F.ROMNEY
ATTORNEY FOR APPEXI.EE
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ADDENDUM

A-l: CERTIFICATE OF INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION.
A-2: ORDER OF SENTENCE

CERTIFICATION OF
INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION
THE UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL
CODE HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT
FORD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.,

a Utah corporation, was involuntarily dissolved by this office on
June 1,1992 for failure to
File an Annual Report,

AS APPEARS OF RECORD IN THE OFFICES OF THE DIVISION.
File Number: CO 029057

tf

«t.rb •*

R i c k Romney (#3949)
P r o v o City A t t o r n e y f s
359 W. Center street
PO Box 1849
Provo, UT
84603
Telephone:
379-6140

Office
p

»UV0 C:Tv CLgRK

IN T H E F O U R T H C I R C U I T COURT, STATE OF U T A H
U T A H COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT

PROVO CITY,
ORDER O F S E N T E N C E
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case N o . 9 4 1 - 8 3 1 M C
J u d g e D o n a l d J. Eyre

M E L B U R N FORD,
Defendant.

T h e Court, h a v i n g p r e v i o u s l y found Defendant, M e l b u r n Ford,
guilty of counts I, I I , III and V in the. information filed in this
case, requested both Plaintiff and Defendant t o submit remediation
p l a n s to the Court.

T h e Court has received

and reviewed

plans and has discussed w i t h counsel for each p a r t y

these

implementation

of these plans as p a r t of sentencing in t h i s m a t t e r .
The Court, h e r e b y e n t e r s t h e following'ORDER OF SENTENCE, as
follows:
1.

T h e Court

imposes

a jail sentence of 90 d a y s for each

count for which D e f e n d a n t w a s found guilty, along w i t h a $750.00
fine

for each count

f o r w h i c h Defendant w a s

found guilty.

The

court suspends the jail sentence and all but $100.00 of the fine on
e a c h count and p l a c e s D e f e n d a n t on p r o b a t i o n to t h e Court.
A-2

The

terms of that probation are that Defendant remediate the condition
of his property which is located within the Provo City limits
adjacent to 1-15 at approximately 820 North and 2000 West.

In

Defendants use of that property in the future, he is not to
violate Provo City ordinances, specifically with respect to Provo
City zoning ordinances and solid waste ordinances.
2.

To remediated the improper use of the property in the

past, the Court orders that Defendant place a permanent sign at the
entry to the property indicating that there will be no dumping on
said property in violation of Provo City ordinances.
3.

Defendant is ordered to secure access to the property

either by some gate or chain so that people have some difficulty
coming onto his property to dump illegally.
4.

The Court also orders that any debris or solid waste on

the property (garbage and unusable materials) be removed from the
property.

The Court sets a date of August 1, 1995 for the debris

and solid waste to be removed from the property.
5. Any material on the property that is salvageable and which
is not normally used in the construction business (scrap metal,
tires, and unusable equipment) is to be salvaged and removed from
the property.
6.

The Court orders that all titled motor vehicles belonging

to Ford Construction be put in an operable condition and registered
on or before November 1, 1995.

If there are titled motor vehicles

that are not repairable and that cannot be placed in a condition in
which they may be registered, such vehicles are to be removed from
the property.
A-3

7.

Any vehicles placed on the subject property temporarily

from another construction site in Provo are to be removed by July
I, 1995.
8.

The Court orders that if Defendant is able to secure a

burn permit to burn large tree stumps or other vegetable material,
he may burn that material on the property.

If such permit is not

obtained, he may not burn this material, but must remove it
(including the large tree stumps) from the property.

Material

which may be used as firewood (but not to include the large tree
stumps) may be stored on the property.
9.

This matter will be set for review to determine the

progress made by Defendant in abiding by this order on September
II, 1995 at 10:00 a.m.
10. Between September 1 and September 11, 1995, Plaintiff may
come upon the property of Defendant, upon the giving of 24 hours
notice to Mr. Schumacher, attorney for Defendant, to review the
progress

of

Defendant

in

complying

with

the

Court's

order.

Plaintiff may come on the property by sending its designated
representative.
11. At the time of trial, the Court found that the use of the
subject property by Interstate Asphalt was not a permitted use of
the property.

The Court orders that, prior to August 1, 1995, the

use of the property by Intferstate Asphalt will cease and that all
personal property and equipment owned by Interstate Asphalt will be
removed from the property.
12. The Court further orders that the asphalt which is in a
windrow on the property is to be used to improve the road on the
A-4

property as part of Defendant's remediation plan.
13. The Court orders that if Defendant, upon review of the
photographs submitted by the Plaintiff as part of its remediation
plan, has any specific objection to any portion of the Plaintiff's
remediation plan, the Defendant, within the next 30 days, may
submit such objections and explanations to the Plaintiff.
14.

Such objections which have not reached settlement between

the parties will be addressed at the review hearing in this matter
on September 11, 1995.

DATED this

1995.

Approved as to form:

Robert J.
Attorney fi
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